One of the things we want to get into with this site is the
issue of what works and what doesn't in terms of combat vehicles in Afghanistan.
Roadside bombs and military grade land mines continue to cause the largest
number of U.S.
casualties there. If there are new tactics or pieces of equipment that can aid
in the counter-IED fight we want to know about it.
Over at the Second Line of Defense site, Robert Johnson gets
into the issue of why there are no heavy brigade combat teams in Afghanistan
and in the process debates the relative merits between tracked and wheeled
vehicles on that battlefield. The main reason there aren't any heavy brigades in Afghanistan is that pretty much
everything must be flown into the country and flying in an entire heavy
brigade, or even a mechanized battalion, is not altogether realistic. Not to
mention providing fuel and spare parts for a heavy unit once its there. The
Russians could just drive their stuff across the Friendship Brigade in the
1980s. We don't have that luxury.
As Johnson points out in his article, the dismal state of
the Afghan road network, and the heavily mountainous terrain, place real limits
on where tracked vehicles could even go. The Soviets found their tanks were
more useful as mobile pillboxes guarding bases and combat outposts than as
offensive weapons. The mujaheddin would usually lay low if tanks were prowling
about.
Yet, Johnson makes a couple of points about the Stryker
vehicle's performance in Afghanistan
that I want to highlight. He contends that the wheeled-vehicles haven't
performed as well as expected (some 21 vehicles lost to IEDs since last
summer) because the network architecture that provides vital communications and
intelligence between vehicles doesn't exist there like it did in Iraq.
He says:
"The connectivity from theater to home station in the past
and today (unlike in Iraq)
remains virtually non-existent in Afghanistan. Therefore,
Stryker formations are unable to utilize their superior on-board C4
architecture to establish a number of network-based advantages when preparing
for on-going operations.
The networks within theater (i.e. within Afghanistan) are not as robust as in Iraq nor are the information platforms (like
UAVs, etc) as plentiful in Afghanistan
as they have been in Iraq.
These key factors explain why Stryker formations in Afghanistan
have been unable to capitalize upon their superior on-board C4 architecture not
only to enhance their protection, but, more importantly, to become more
effective in their mission.
On balance, these factors create more of a disadvantage for the Stryker
formations than the HBCTs, which, absent the more advanced on-board C4
architectures, are a more self-reliant formation in terms of the mobility,
armor protection, and firepower components of protection."
I'd be interested to hear from any knowledgeable folks out
there whether the network situation in Afghanistan is as bad as Johnson
portrays it, and, if so, how big a difference does it make in the counter-IED
fight and Stryker unit performance. Is Johnson right to argue that the command,
control and intelligence advantages of the Stryker are not being properly
leveraged in Afghanistan?
